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During theinterwar period the Camerounian rural population became 
a peasantry; cultivation for the market replaced gathering as the basis 
·of the cash economy and the rural population came to occupy a position in 
anaU.onal political structure. In West Africa as a whole, this process 
of "peasantiz11tion" followed a different course than in areas of white 
.settlement where policies in the early years of colonial rule opened up a 
pel;liianent structural gap between indigenous and foreign production, creating, 
as Rey and Duprl! theorize, 1 a situation which could be maintained by a com-
2 
·bination of property law and market forces. 
In West Africa the institutionalization of the peasantry did not, on 
the whole, involve policies which deprived them of land or access to markets 
for their produce. The st:uuctural position of the peasantry in the national 
economy was dete:i;mined through a long term process of experimentation and 
attrition over the relative shares of the peasants, the state, and commerce 
:i,n ,the income generated in the rural sector. The process of fixing the level 
of .appropriation from the peasantry in ancient and feudal state systems was a 
. '· 
iiroi:ess that spanned.centuries and resulted in locally specific systems of 
extraordinary intric;acy. In Africa it was col,lapsed into a time period which 
was not only very brief, but was characterized by major political events and 
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economic developments in the outside world, The differences which emerged 
amon~ AJ;rican peasantries are due to the conjunction of central policy, local 
response, and economic feasibility as they affected each other during this 
.Period of general instability, 
Taxes, although not the only form of appropriation from the peasantry, 
•itre crucial to.understanding the process of peasantization because through 
t~llation was forged the mutual institutionalization of the peasantry, the 
111/lrket, and the state:· tax levels entered into peasant production decisions 
.• ~nc! t;herefore affected the allocation of resources in the indigenous sys.tern; 
th¢ tax base affected. government decisions about national expenditure; and the 
payment of direct taxes ensured the commercial interests of a certain level of 
~·usJ1rnss. The co!llPlexity of the vested interests in the tax structure and 
the.ir variation over time and geographical regions, has made it a very difficu:J.t 
sI1bject for . generalization. At the risk of caricaturing their carefully 
qua+ified statements, one can summarize the two main positions, represented 
3 4 by Hopkins and Suret-Canale, 
H9pkins interprets taxation :policy as a reflection of the vested interests 
~f thr government and t;he commercial companies in a gradually rising African 
~tandard of living • 
• ,.it was necessary to make sure that some of the gains from 
international trade accrued to Africa because, in the last 
resort, if Africans remained poor, they could not afford 
to bµy manufactured goods (p.189). 
financial policy was integrated with these interests by the government leaving 
ll!Qney in the pockets of the producers and raising most of their revenue from 
c4s1;oms duties. 
To achieve financial self-sufficiency, both British.and French 
colonies relied mainly on revenues from customs duties, which 
acco1.1nted for more than half of total revenue for the. greater 
part of the colonial period (p. 191), 
His characterization of African producers under colonial rule is of entre-
preneurs "responsive to monetary incentives" (p. 295), Direct taxation 
receives very little attention and, in its absence, trends in real incomes 
are deduced from trends in terms of trade (p. 183). · By this criterion, "it 
is certain that Africans gained considerably from participating in inter-
national .trade" (p. 183). 
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ln his analysis of French colonialism Suret-Canale emphasizes that 
commercial interests in the peasantry were above all in production, since 
import p1.1rch~sing power was concentrated in the European population and the 
indigenous elite (p. 294). Government financing was dominated by direct taxes 
pn the population. 
lndirect taxes formed about a quarter of revenue (in Senegal 
one tpird) the rest being made up of other direct taxes (p, 344). 
The African producer is presented as struggling under the weight of compulsions, 
·of which the head tax was the most important (p. 345). The net result was 
profound pauperization of the African peasantry (p. 294). 
The differences between these two interpretations stem in part from their 
.basic theoretical position, but there are also empirical differences among 
the different colonial systems and from one local region to another, This 
paper analyzes the interrelationship of state tax policy, market conditions 
for export crops, and producers' real incomes in Cameroun during the interwar 
period. Although limited to one country, it is a comparative study in a 
number of ways. 
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.First, Cameroun experienced a changing rate of direct taxation during the 
interwar period, which can be analyzed in terms of changing economic and 
political conditions, The decade 1925-1934 comes much closer to Suret-Canale's 
·characterization of general colonial policy than the years before and after. 5 
Second, the .Annual Report to the League of Nations for 1935 gives enough data 
on indigenous production and head tax provisions for each of the seventeen 
· administrative r.egions that the different impact of taxation policy in different 
areas can be assessed, Third, the process of change in taxation will be 
discussed in detail for the Circumscription of Yaoundi, the single most important 
. region in Cameroun's eJ<Port economy, which experienced aspects of both of the 
_apparently contrad;ictory situations discussed above. It was one of the rela-
tively wealthy areas of the country, with export crop_production and real incomes 
both rising by the end of the interwar period, while at the same time enduring 
many of the 'exactions of the "colonial mode of production, 116 
· It will-be suggested that the colonial mode of production, with high direct 
taxation and heavy reltance on obligatory measures, had a different impact on 
J;>easan1; ;incomes according to local conditions. In areas with no commercial 
i~frastructure, constraint dominated the structure of economic opportunities. 
In areas w;ith natural resources and access to markets, but relatively small and 
dispersed populations, direct control of economic enterprise was both more 
difficult and less rewarding than in densely populated areas. Where local 
populations were large and well situated on commercial networks, there was 
clearly more to be gained from direct appropriation, but at the same time high 
direct taxation posed serious problems of control. These problems were met 
by the creat;ion or maintenance of an ;indigenous elite of chiefs and notables 
who carried out central policy on the local level, The interests of the elite 
5 
and the;i.r changing relationship with the people and with the colonial govern-
ment are cruci~l for an understanding of the economic behavior of the particular 
7 l?cal populations which became the peasantry, The long-term political 
implications of local colonial policies in Cameroun has been analyzed by 
Richard Joseph. 8 Tl)is paper complements his work by focusing on the local 
impact of taxation policy. 
·l'1;u:t l: · Background to Taxat.ion Policy 
France assumed formal control over Cameroun in 1921, under the newly 
created mandate system of the League of Nations, Financial policy was to a 
certain exteni: affecl!ed by the conditions of the mandate. First, the ultimate 
destiny of the iqandated territories was unclear, which made them a poor pros-
pect for both grants from.the metropolitan government and international loans, 9 
10 Early studies of the economic potential of Cameroun suggested that current 
revenue could be a source of capital for development, so the government turned 
to· internal sources to raise funds. In fact, the budget for 1922-1929 shows 
-that twenty-three percent of total revenue went into reserve for investment 
. · 11 purposes. This gave the administration an incentive to raise taxes. Second, 
th~ condttions of the mandate required France to maintain free trade. France's 
~wn interests in the 1920s lay in maintaining or extending its purchases of 
12 
·raw materials within the franc zone because of the weakness of the franc, 
but it was 11,ot' able to dominate the trade of Cameroun to the same extent as 
' . 13 
. French West Africa. France's share of Cameroun's imports, by value, varied 
~ . 
~round one~third for the whole interwar period, althoui:µ, it managed to raise 
its share of exports from one-third 111 the mid-twenties to over half in the 
6 
midTthirties. 14 France's own economic interests therefore were more in 
Cameroun' s exports than its imports. These two aims, of financing development 
without taking out loans and encouraging export of raw materials rather than 
indigenous consumption of manufactured goods, militated in favor of direct 
taii,ation. 
The government's explicit justification for its head tax policy was more 
social than directly financial. Head tax was justified as a continuation of, 
15 
and an improvement on, precolonial tribute systems. The objectives were 
ou.tlined in the first report to the League of Nations in 1922, and they 
consisted of the.pro~essive elimination of polygamy and adjustment of the 
tax burden to the economic potential of each region. The tax on childless 
women was intended to be first, a kind of property tax, since wives were a 
liiajor source and sign of wealth; 1;1econd, an attempt to undermine traditional 
wealth structures; and third, a pro-natalist measure to prevent the accumu-
lation of women by older men. The graduation of head tax by region was 
intended to reflect the existing differentials in access to markets for export 
crops. The rough guideline for setting the tax rate in favorably placed 
regions was twentyTfive percent of money income, although during the Depression 
it was claimed to be ten percent of money income, based on estimates for the 
16 budget of a household of one man and two wives. The orientation of the 
region to the export market was the crucial criterion in judging how much the 
hypothetical househo.l'd could earn. The stated policy was therefore for the 
government to appropriate a constant proportion of Camerounian incomes, based 
on regional e1;1timates associated with distance from the export market. 
In fact, both of .these objectives yielded to priorities of fiscal policy. 
Taxes on women were increased even when polygamy was declining, and they were 
7 
broadened. in application to exempt only women with five or more living 
children under :fourteen years. J!'amily budget estimates were only made inter-
mittently and head tax became a:n elastic category of the colonial budget. 
Stated tax policy is therefore of limited value as a means of understanding 
the trend in the tax rate. 
17 Aggregate Trends in Taxation and Export Production 1922-1937 
The economic history of the interwar period falls into.four separate 
,phases, each.of which will be discussed separately (see J!'igures 1, 2, and 3) • 
. The central focus im this analysis is on the trend in the real income of 
.Afriea11 farmers, and the factors which account fo:,; it. This trend is the 
out;come of: market conditions, as reflected in the value of agricultural 
.exp.orts, .state policy, as reflected in the level of head tax, and peasant 
production, as reflected in export tonnage of the eight major crops. 
The period 1922-1926 is dominated by two facts: the devaluation of the 
)!'rench franc and the recent and experimental nature of the French administration. 
The main government priorities were still related to consolidating its control 
a:nd setting up administrative structures. During the same period the franc 
fell rapidly pn the world inarket. Since Cameroun's trade was so heavily with 
non-franc countries, the franc value of its exports rose dramatically, and 
w;ith them agricultural incomes. Customs duties, being ad valorem taxes, 
··:.esponded automat;l.cally to the p:,;ice change; head taxes being fixed amounts, 
did ·not. AJ,though head tax increased in absolute amount, its share of 
·government revenue fell ~teadily. 
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Table 1: 1~26 Export! Value, Government Revenue, and Export Tonnage 
(1922=100) 
Value of Agricultural exporta ••••••••••••••• 598 
Government Revenue ••.••.•••.••••••••••••••.• 400 
Customs Duties .... , .. , ..... ,,.,,•.•.,,,, •. 467 
Head Tax • •••.•••.•.••.•••••.••••• , • , , • , , •• 214 
Tonnage agricultural exports ••••••••• , •• , ••• 160 
9 
Dur:l,ni: .this per:j.od of rapidly changing prices and imcomplete control of the 
c11untry, the government all.owed head taii; to fall to the lowest it would ever 
be,-foi: · the ip.terwar years. In 1926 it provided twenty-four percent of total 
wivernment rElvenue, against forty-five percent in 1922. As a proportion of 
fSt"icultt1r:8l :i.ncomes, it fell from twenty-nine percent of FOB export value, to 
ten pei;ceint, the close11t it would ever come to.a "tithe." Customs duties, on 
tqe other hand, rose to higher levels than at any other time during the interwar 
P$1,'iqd: forty-three percent of goverment. revenue in 1925, by comparison with 
thirty-three percent in 1922, 
. ' . ) ' ' . . 
Du1~ng ~9~5 measur~s were taken to increase the share of head tax in 
government revenue. Customs duties were reassessed and local administration 
was strengthened to make direct taxes easier to impose. In 1926, the franc was 
sliabili,zed, so t;hat export values leveled off, and at the same time export 
. tonnage was-~ept down by the exceptional mobilization of resources for devel-
, 
opJ11ent of tb,e infr11structure. As a result, the years 1926-1929 saw stagnation 
i~ everything except the head tax rate. 
Table 2: 1929 Export Value, Governll)ent R,evenue and Export_ 'Ionna,ge .. 
- -· .. - 1929=100 . 
Value of Agricultural Exports •• , ............... 95 
GoverO.lilen.t ·Revenu~ . ..... , ... · .. , ...... ·.·,. -..... , 121 
<;:ustpms Duties., .... , .. ,,,.,,.~,.,,.- ••. ,,, ... , 94 
Head· Tax ••••••••. · ••••••••.•••••••••••••• , ••• ,176 
Tonnage agricultural products ••••••••••••••••• 120 
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The year 1926 marks the beginning of ama:jor change in financial policy which 
shifted the burden of government revenue away from customs duties, towards 
direct forms of appropriation. By 1929 head tax was up to thirty-five percent 
of revenue and twenty-nine percent of the FOB value of export crops. 
During the Depression this policy was greatly intensified. Head tax was 
first increased and then later reduced to the 1929 level in order to cover 
government expenses in the absence of customs revenue. Agricultural incomes 
declined, making head tax both the major source of government revenue (fifty 
percent in 1932) and the major item in farmers' expenditure (forty-eight percent 
of total FOB crop value in 1934). 
Table 3: 1934 Export Value, Government Revenue and Export Tonnage 
(1929=100) 
Value of Agricultural Exports •••••••••••••• 40 
Government Revenue ..•.............•........ 88 
Customs Duties .. · ............................................ -.. 44 
·· Head Tax ••••.• •· •••.•••.•••••..••••••..••• 100 
Tonnage agricultural products 129 
The five years of the Depression saw the extreme of the policy of direct appro-
priation from the Camerounian population. The importance of direct taxes in 
financing the government during the Depression must surely be added to Hopkins' 
iist of ways in which budget crisis was a~oided. These include increased 
customs duties,. reduced expenditure, and grants and loans raised from metropol-
18 itan governments. Cameroun balanced .its budget throughout the Depression 
witp. rE1latively limited cutbacks in the budget; 19~2 was the lowest point, with 
revenue at seventy-four percent of its peak in 1929, and expenses at eighty 
pei:cent of their peak in 1930, The "fine style" 19 with which Cameroun came 
through the Depression was purchased at the price of intensification of the 
level of direct appropriation. 
11 
The weight of the load transferred to the Camerounian population resulted, if 
not in outright violence, in a profound hostility for the government. With 
the threat of disaffection on a large scale, the government revised head tax 
policy. While it was reduced piecemeal in certain regions, on the whole it 
was simply frozen at the level it had reached in 1934. With the post-Depression 
boom, the financial balance began to revert to the pattern of the early 1920s: 
head tax fell to about one third of government revenue, customs duties increased, 
and total export value rose. 
Table 4: 1937 Export Value, Government Revenue,and Export Tonnage 
(1934=100) 
Value of agricultural exports •••.••••••••• 372 
·Government Revenue .••...........•..•••••••. 156 
Cuijtoms Dut'ies .......................... 335 
Head Tax . ..................•.... .-...... . 111 
Tonnage agricultural exports ••••••••••••••• 157 
Cameroun therefore experienced both of the patterns of economic policy outlined 
in the introduction, but at different periods: low head tax before 1926 and 
after 1934, high head tax in the intervening decade which spans both prosperity 
and depression. 
What was the effect, then, of changing prices and changing taxation policy 
on agricultural production and rural real incomes? It is clear from Figure 4 
that both production and real incomes grew fastest in the periods of rising 
prices and low taxes. Up to 1925 tonnage increased by seventy percent and 
real incomes by 225 percent. However, this period must be seen as part of the 
process of recovery from the dislocation of World War I, the change of 
administration, and the slump of 1920-1921. In 1922 Camerounian incomes were 
very low. Even in 1926 its exports 
hundred inhabita~ts) of French West 
were only two-thirds of the value (per one 
20 Africa and its imports were even less. 
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'4-though incomes were rising, they were rising from a low starting place. 
The decade from 1925 to 1934, however, shows a pattern of slow export growth 
;,.t1d stagnant rea;I. incomes. While total export tonnage 'l\'al! forty-eight percent 
~igher in 1934 than in 1925, real incomes were exactly the same, having 
experienced a deep decline quring the Depression. Over the decade as a whole 
.the rural population produced more in order to stay in the same place. 
21 Exports for this decade,. characterized by Assoumou as the period of constraint,, 
were relatively stagnant by comparison wit.h the years both before and after. 
Export tonnage of the main agricultural products grew at only five percent 
per year.during this period, whereas before 1925 and after 1934 the growth 
rate was twenty percent per year. However, in terms of the structure of 
peasant· production there were fundamental.changes which took place during 
·· the decade of constraint (Figure 5). Before 1925 most of the growth was in 
palm products which were, almost everywhere, prepared from wild trees. The 
expansion of production can therefore be interpreted as a response to price 
incentives in the short run, , After 1934 most of the growth was in cultivated 
crops, particularly tree crops which were planted during the decade of 
constraint when real incolll"s were at their lowest. 
Coquery-Vidtovitch •·s explanatipn of f;his radical change is that farmers 
simply had no choice for paying their taxes. 22 However, the problem with 
this argi,ment for the areas of tree crop production is that planting dur:l.ng 
tj:te Depression did not help with the immediate problem of paying this year's 
taxes. Farmers were still raisiµg income from the old sources to pay taxes 
.at the same time as they were increasingly investing in tree crop plantations. 
The explanation of direct constraint is not completely satisfying either. 
The governiuant did inaugurate a program to extend cash crop cultivation 
14 
during the Depression, but with varying success. There are numerous examples 
23 
of farmers not cooperating with forced cultivation schemes, and, on the 
other hand, of farm~rs going out of their way to acquire planting material 
24 from each other. 
One major fact is basic to understanding the changeover from gathered 
palJll products to cultivated coffee anq cocoa: even at the current low prices, 
the returns to labor from an established cocoa farm were much higher than 
from palni products. .Jeanne Henn has calculated that in 193.3 the head tax for 
the Yaounde region, for one man and one. woman, took 165 man-days of work if 
it was paid out of palm kernels, and only tw<a!nty-three if it was paid out of 
25 
cocoa. At the level of appropriation, in both labor and cash, which the 
rural population was subject to during the decade of constraint, the only 
26 hope for maintain;i.ng the standard of living was to economize on labor. 
However, the ab;i.l;i.ty to absorb the very high .costs of this decade and invest 
at the same time varied with the local conjunction of fiscal and agricul-
tural pol;i.cy with indigenous political and economic conditions. The growth 
of the 193Os was 1.1nevep.ly distributed both geographically and socially. 
After 1934, as head tax was held constant and both export tonnage and 
prices rose, real ;incomes also rose for the first time since 1925. In 1937 
they were more than twice as high as in 1934. 27 The basis for this increase 
was the diversification of the rural economy away from palm products, The 
regions and social strata which achieved this were those which benef;i.ted 
most ·frolll the changed cond;i.tions. In case this ;improvement should seem 
dramatic, it is important to note that up until 1934 poorer people's purchases 
had been extremely modest, amount;i.ng, in the wealthier regions, to one new 
28 
cloth per person per year, salt, and farm tools. If FOB prices are modified 
., 
to take account of local pricevariations, the head tax in Yaounde in 1935 
15 
amounted to at least forty-two percent of agricultural incomes. During the 
period when average real income was static, the standard of living of the 
elite rose dramatically, indicating that the poor were, on the whole, getting 
poorer and working harder. 
The aggregate patterns analyzed in this section therefore need serious 
qualification in two ways: they neglect regional differences and they do not 
take into account the stratification of the rural ROpulation. These are the 
main topics of the following sections. 
Part 3: Regional Analysis, 1935 
Differences in the local impact of tax policy can be analyzed for the 
year 1935 be.cause the Annual Reports for this period include estimates of 
indigenous agricultural production by crop and by region, budgetary provisions 
29 for head tax in each region, and regional population statistics. When 
regional export values and head tax levels are compared, two clearly different 
patterns emerge. 30 Nine regions had low export value and low head taxes, 
but head tax averaged seventy-five percent of export value produced. This 
indicates that, at a low level of participation in the national economy, 
these producers' cash incomes were more or less completely cancelled out by 
head tax (Figures 6 and 7). All these poor regions were off the commercial 
networks and therefore had very limited opportunities for developing sales 
beyond the obligatory minimum, Seven administrative regions had much 
higher taxes but they amounteµ to only twenty-nine percent of total export 
31 
value produced. 
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Table 5: Patterns of Regional Production and Taxation, 1935 
Nine Poor Regions Seven Wealthy Regions 
Percent of: 
Total Population 43 55 
Agricultural 12 88 
export value 
Total head tax 25 71 
(Note: Douala/region is omitted because of the urban nature of its economy.) 
The 1;1even richer regions are those of the "fertile crescent" around 
32 the main railway lines in the South. However, within the category of rela-
tively wealthy regions, there are striking differences in the level of 
appropriation through taxes, from sixty-five percent in Dschang to twelve 
percent in Nkongsamba. This variation is paralleled by the relative impor-
tance of the old expor,t staples of palm products and annual crops in export 
production. The regions with high taxes relative to incomes were still 
producing most of their cash 'income from palms and annual crops grown in 
traditional fields in 1935, whereas the regions with low taxes relative to 
incomes had already diversified production to more lucrative cocoa and coffee. 
Table 6: Tax rate and export value in palm products 
and annual crops, by region, 1935 
Nkongsamba 
Ebolowa 
Yabassi 
Edea 
/ Yaounde 
, Dschang 
Head tax as·percentage of 
agricultural export value 
12 
20 
20 
31 
33 
65 
(Note: Garoua opdtted, see fn. 28). 
Palm products, annual 
crops, as percentage 
of export value 
34 
1 
52 
81 
63 
87 
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This association is due to two factors, First, the government policy of holding 
hea(l · t;ax stable after 1934 essentially resulted in the maintenance of taxes at 
the levi:,1 they ha(! reached in eac;h region before the expansion of tree crops, 
· The. tax bur<)en was not sul;,stantially readj.;sted to the rapidly changing 
regional distribution of wealth due to the diversification of the economy away 
from palm products, Second, different regions diversified their economy at 
different rates and in different ways, For these regions there are three main 
questions about the dec;ade of constraint, 1) What forces determined the local 
level pf head taxation? {this will be discussed in Part 4), 2) How, and with 
wqat implications for indigenous econpmic organization, was its cost absorbed? 
3) ~at factors.were important in the rate of investment in tree crops? 
The absorption of. the increased tax burden took the same classic form 
througho\lt Southern Cameroun: increased work. 33 As Chayanov theorizes, a 
pe~santr 1 can withstand low returns to labor simply by working harder, either 
,by working its labor force longer hours, or by increasing its effective labor 
force. Although this is a strength in terms of survival, it is a weakness in 
.terms of political position, and has profound implications for the internal 
.organization of the family. The overwhelming impression given by the documents 
of this period is that women and children were drawn into the colonial economy 
to a much greater extent than pr~viously, both in the domestic cash economy and 
in unpaid work fpr the government. 
During the Depression the two crops which f·inanced direct taxation were 
,palm products and groundnuts. Groundnuts were grown at this time almost exc;lu-
s.ively on the food farms of the· women of the forest region so that increased 
sales imply the increased use of women's labor to provide cash income. 
Similarly, processing palm products was mainly women's and children's work. 
• 
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The children's task was cracking the nuts between two stones to extract the 
kernels. 34 A local report during the Depression pointed out that a man 
without a wife was in particularly difficult straits for paying his taxes, 
35 even though the amount he had to raise was less than a married man. 
Direct contributions of women to the colonial economy included food 
36 
requisitions, porterage, road-building and maintenance, and in some urban 
areas, street-cleaning. · The following eyewitness report is an example of the 
most time-consuming and arduous of women's new tasks, porterage, 
The visitor to the Cameroons may frequently see long lines 
of natives, mostly women and children, carryin& loads of 
peanuts on their backs over a distance requiring in many 
cases two or three days' walk.37 
This effort was in addition to their traditional work of maintaining the 
subsistence system. The inability ,;,f the women and children to r.esist may be 
seen as a factor in the adjustment of the peasantry as a whole to the 
increased demands of the decade of constraint, The only escape for women was 
flight to the missions, but this also entailed a life of unremitting hard 
work. 38 Unlike the younger men, who fled in large numbers to other areas, 39 
the women had no realistic alternative to their current situation. The 
capacity of the rural popul~tion to absorb a high tax rate and invest at the 
·same time was heavily dependent on the mobilization of the female labor 
force, In this respect all the populations of Southern Cameroun were in a 
similar position, since the women were the principal farmers in all areas, 
and were also very closely controlled in the traditional social organization. 
However, the higher the.tax level rose relative to income, the less labor 
was available for !,;vestment in establishing tree crops. 
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The diversification of the agricultural economy in Southern Cameroon is 
a subject still not studied in detail for each region and each crop. The 
following outline is a preliminary attempt to point out some of the most 
important factors in what was a very complex development. The siwltaneous 
presence of constraint and incentives, both of which had different impacts in 
different regions, makes overall generalization very difficult. However, the 
available information supports the following interpretation. 
Tree crops were first promoted on the farms of the administrative chiefs 
and indigenous notables during the early years of French rule. 40 In the 
Bamileke area of Dschang the chiefs had a traditional basis for their position, 
whereas in the rest of the south they were appointed and maintained in their 
elite po.sition by the government alone. While the chiefs' plantations may have· 
been intended originally as "demonstration plots" they evolved as a source 
of personal· enrichment and as.a supplement to the chiefs' income from the 
government. In mo.st cases the laborers who did the work were villagers, who 
. u 
supplied unpaid, or at best poorly paid, labor up to one or two days a week. 
By the Depression the government chiefs had established patterns of export 
crop production different from their suqjects. The reports of the tax investi-
gations in 1932 show that the basis of the poorer villagers' cash economy was 
still palm products and annual crops, whereas the chiefs and notables had 
tree crops already at bearing age. 42 In the major cocoa producing region of 
the Center-South the following cases are reported, In Yaoundt a canton chief 
produced six tons of cocoa in 1932, almost a third of the total production for 
hts village, 43 In Ebolowa the tax report notes: "Every family budget is a 
function of the social importance of the family head and his family situation." 
Half the cocoa trees belonged to one-eighth of the taxable population, 44 
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During the Depression the government introduced various measures of 
constraint to increase tree crop acreage: nurseries in the villages, oblig-
atory village plantations, and the sanction of the indigenat to enforce the 
upkeep of private plantations already established. In areas with poor access 
to the commercial network the program encountered passive resistance and 
45 progressed slowly. In the wealthier areas, Table 6 shows that tree crops had 
advanced much further in Nkongsamba, Ebolowa, and Yabassi, where they were 
between forty-eight percent and ninety-five percent of total export value in 
1935, than Edea, Yaounde, and Dschang, where they were thirty-seven percent or 
less. Per capita incomes, after tax, were consequently much higher in those 
regions: an average of 69F as opposed to 28F. (Note that this is calculated 
on FOB, not local, prices.) The implications of these statistics are corrob-
orated by documentary sources. In the first three regions tree crop production 
moved ahead rapidly with the full participation of the indigenous farmers. The 
agriculture report for Ebolowa in 1932 notes: 
The populations visited have put out a surprising effort 
in the economic domain •..• Cocoa. The plantations are in 
excellent condition.46 
In 'Nkongsamba Camerounian planters had developed a wage labor economy on the 
pattern of the European plantations which had been forced out by the Depression.4 7 
By contrast, the Edea region remained recalcitrant to all government efforts 
to diversify their economy away from palm products. / From Yaounde came reports 
of farmers struggling on their own to establish cocoa plantations,48 and in 
Dschang production of coffee by the village population was held back by the 
government. 
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Of the three latter cases, Edea is the most difficult to explain. 
Possibly their much greater investment in the skilled work of palm oil 
preparation, in contrast to the unskilled work of cracking palm kernels, 
made them more reluctant to change crops than the other regions where 
kernels were the major money-maker. Only Edea prqduced large quantities 
· of commercial grade palm oil, wh:tch, like· cocoa, brought relatively higher 
returns .to labor than T.ernels. In spite of their similar ecological 
position to the rest of the south, the Bassa people of the Edea region 
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have never developed a cocoa economy. 
/ ' In Yaounde and Dschang the barriers wete more clearly institutional, 
since they have now become. the major producers of cocoa and coffee 
respectively. The evidence suggests that the barriers were the continued 
importance of their chieft~incy systems and a government policy which 
continued to provide preferential conditions for agricultural production by 
an elite. The importance of the elite in these areas rather than the others 
is related to their populati.ons. Yaounde' and Dschang together accounted for 
sixty-six percent of the population of the fertile crescent. In these most 
heavily populated regions the government continued to pursue a chieftaincy 
policy long after it had been effectively allowed to decline in less 
populous regions. 
It is in Yaounde' and Dschang that the agriculture reports show a clear 
preference for elite tree crop production well into the 1930s •. In Dschang, 
"We reminded them that the establi$hment c;,f coffee plantations should remain 
50 
the prerogative of an elite." Reviewing the acreages in the Bamileke area 
for the 1940s, .Tardits concludes that coffee cultivation benefited the 
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notables, above all. The combination of relatively high tax rates with 
thwarted attempts at developing tree crop production, left the large 
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population of the Bamileke area "a virtual labour reserve" 
European and Camerounian plantations of Nkongsamba. 
for the developing 
Agricultural policy in Yaoundl was less clear-cut, reflecting the 
chronic ambivalence of the relationship between the colonial government 
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and the chieftaincy system it maintained. An agricultural report for 1933 
still gave most of its coverage to the plantations of the chiefs and notables, 
·with half a page noting that the rest of the population was beginning to grow 
cocoa, but badly, and evidently without the help of extension agents. One of 
the recommendations of the report was that these farmers should also receive 
technical advice. 
This brief survey suggests that within the ranks of the relatively 
wealthy regions of the fertile crescent, there is an association between high 
taxes relative to income, slow development of tree crops, and the maintenance 
of an elite in the rural areas around the chiefs and notables. The national 
policy of constraint therefore had very important differences in local impact, 
depending on the local institutions it needed to make it work in varying 
situations. The government imposed an indigenous chieftaincy system in all 
regions, but its commitment to the chiefs was strongest in areas with rich 
natural resources and large populations. A policy of direct taxation had to 
create or maintain a social hierarchy which could extract the required 
surpluses, and the densely populated and productive regions were clearly 
more promising terrain than regions with sparse populations or poor commerical 
networks. 
1· .• 
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Part 4; The Tax Rate and Social Policy in the Circumscription of Yaound€ 
This sect;;l,on traces the politics of chieftaincy and taxation in the 
Circumscription of Yaounde which was one of the key resources of the colonial 
economy, Yac:,unde had the: hrgest population (eight;een perceI\t of the total 
for the country), prc;,duced twenty-seven ·percent of govern111E1nt revenue from 
d:1-rect taxe11, anp t;hirty'-one pefcent of indigenous export value, in 1935 • 
. ' It 'ifas·tnerefore crucial to the government to tap its we11lth, but .also to 
reta:1-n ;i,tsl'ol;l.tiaal support;,·ei<Pecially since the city of Yaounde was the 
ne.tiot)al capital. 
Bet':w11en'1921 and 192~ the ta,c rate in Yaoundif more than tripied. )!'rom 
lOF per !Dall and. ~F per cltildless woman in 1921 it rose to 25F per man and l5F 
per WQl!Uln i .1~29. qur:i-ng the peak of the Depression in 1931 the rate was 
.. :1-ncre.isecl to 21F ancl 22F. By 1936 the central districts of the circumscription 
pai.d 32F.fot' ;i man, 30F for a woman, with the women benefiting from 
exemptions.only if they had five living children under fourteen years old, 54 
Taxes, fqod requ:1-isitions and corve'e labor duties were all organized 
thri;,ugh the indigenous chiefs. The trend in the development of the chief-
taincy -system para:J_lels exactly the trend in direct appropriation shown in 
the budget; statist:1-cs. The chieftaincy was elaborated and strengthened in 
192~·, t;fie point ai: which direct taxation turned upward, and was gradually 
µnderm:i.ned after 1934, the beginning of the downward turn in pirect taxation. 
When the French set up a local administration ~ystem in Yaounde' after 
19:1-6 there wa11 a.vacuum ;i,n tlte indigenous leadersqip. Charles Atangana, 
th!l fi!en;l.or c;hief unqer the (lerl!Ulns, and most of t!i.e impori:ant chiefs acco111-
_paqied the Germans in _their retreat t;o Fernando Po. 55 Atangana and the Be1;1· 
(;hiefs remained in exile,. p;irt c;,f tqe tilllEI in Europe, until the French 
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administr~tion allowed them to return and reinstated them in 1922. The 
decision to recall them was taken with many misgivings about their loyalties, 
but the Y1;1ounde' area :was not well administered by their replacements, who 
. l,l - 56 could not even co ect the taxes. By 1922 the French had rebuilt the 
Gei11!an administrative structure, with, in ·many cases, the same people as 
indigenous chiefs. 'fhis chieftaincy system had no basis in the precolonial . 
!locial structµre. Whereas the largest independent political units had 
consisted of several huµdred pec;,ple during the precolonial .period, the 
, superior chiefs of the colonial period ruled populations in the tens of 
57 thousands. Since the,e w1;1s no traditional basis for the economic support 
of any position above a village headman, an\! since the expenses of ruling 
such large populations were substantial, the chiefs depended almost entirely 
on government support to provide them with an income. In fact, the govern-
ment supported them in a variety of ways, but the major source of their 
income was 1;1 percentage share of the taxes collected from their people. 
Until the end of the 1930s, Charles Atangana, the superior chief of Yaounde 
58 Subdivision, was the only one who received a regular fixed salary. 
In 1925 two major innovations were made to strengthen the chieftaincy system 
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nat;i.onwide .• Canton chiefs were installed as a middle level in the hierarchy, 
b.etween superior chiefs and village ch;l.efs, with responsibility for popl\-
lations of between five and twenty thousand. This was considered a more 
manageable number than the nruch larger populations under the superior chiefs. 
Seconq, the commissioner created councils of notables in each of the adminis-
trative regions. The following is Article 1 of the Arr@te' which created the 
councils: 
At the headquarters of each circumscription is created 
a consultative council of notables, charged with 
assisting tpe chief of the circumscription in examination 
of financial, economic or social questions, to enlighten 
the administration on the resources and needs of the 
circumscription, to manifest the wishes of the indigenous 
population, 60 
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The council met twice a year to discuss an agenda decided on by the admin-
istration, 
With no traditional legitimacy or economic ✓ base, the Yaounde chiefs 
identified their political and economic interests with the government 
afmost completely. Their· advice during the years before the Depression 
was entirely collabor.ative. Since the:f.r owri. economic welfare depended to a 
large extent .on the tax rate, they repeatedly advised that the contributive 
capacity of the people had not yet been reached, and they supported all 
measures to maintain their tax base by limiting the mobil:lty of the popu-
;I.ation. Th<;!se measures included the incr(;!ase in the cost of trade licenses, 
in order to control entry into trade as an occupation, the implementation of 
vagabondage laws· and passes, which returned the unemployed to their home area, 
and higher·taxes for the "floating populations." They contested tax exemp,-
tions for some of the convalescents from sleeping sickness, and opposed 
commutation of corve'e labor duties to casp on the grounds that they could 
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not carry out publ:i-c works if people were allowed to avoid work. To the 
officially sanctioned appropriations many ch;iefs added their own, mainly in 
lal:,or for ho11sebuilding and farmwork. At this time the.most important forl)l 
of .. rebellion was migration. An estimated twenty to twenty-five thousand people 
had. fled from the Circumscription of Yaound{ by 1928. 62 The strengthening of 
~he chieft~incy system therefore both facilitated the collection of direct 
taxes ·and added a contributive factor in forcing them upward. 
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The Depression, however, made the chiefs aware of the true ambiguity 
their position. In 1931, when the tax rate was increased and prices fell 
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catastrophically, !'exceptional measures" were required to get the taxes in. 
This was not only exerted against the people but against the chiefs. Head 
tax had always been estimated on.the basis of village censuses, and the chiefs 
had been allotted lump sums to collect; they were responi;,ible for any shortfall. 
Apart from their own endangered economic welfare, the chiefs also saw that 
the administration's ta;ic policy was implemented in direct contradictioq to 
their advice, and was ruinous of their relations with the people. For the 
first time they began to advise reductions in the tax rate, but were overruled 
,by the admin:l.stration. When asked, in the formal manner for their opinion 
.on incre;J.sed head taxes at the meeting of the council of notables in 1931, 
.Onambele M'Bazoa answered: "We have nothing to say. You put before us a 
fait ·accompli." Their objections were overruled and they were sternly reminded 
"that it isa great honor which the administration bestows on you in naming 
YO'-! to the Council of Notables. 1164 The chiefs found themselves powerless. 
In the new atmosphere of distrust between them and the government, they found 
_themselves blamed and punished for the excesses they committed in order to 
get the taxes in, and responsible for pay:l.ng any amount they failed to collect. 
The antagonism between the people and the administration also intensified. 
In his report oµ ta;ices in Yaounde, the administrator of Yaoundt! Circumscription 
wrot;e: 
The ent:l.re activity of the Circumscription has been ailjled at 
a single purpose, the payment of taxes ••• ,This purely fiscal 
pol:).cy •• ,!J.as created on the part of the native a disaffectio_n 
toward us aI\d a·mtstrust which, if.other factors encourage it, 
and if there are no remed:).es made, will soon transform itself 
iµto open ho~tility.65 
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The average daily prison population under the indige'nat was at its highest 
66 in 1932, indicating the mutual hostility which developed, In the north 
of the circumscription, on the borders of low population density regions, 
67 people simply deserted, so that villages were left entirely empty, Where 
more active resistance took place, it fell against the chiefs rather than 
directly against the adnµ.nistration, Letters and petitions were sent to the 
French administration complaining of chiefs' exactions, and five hundred 
people are said to have marched to 
chief who had been a pillar of the 
Yaounde' to protest against an important 
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administration during the 1920s. 
After the Depression th.is agitation against the chiefs began slowly to 
take effect •. The government initiated measures which g:radual:1.y reduced 
their pot-1ers and took more vigorous measures against "abuses." Between 
1932 and 1934 policies were inaugurated to reduce the tax burden and to 
reorganize the chieftaincy. ' Commissioner Bonnecarere issued a general 
circular on the chieftaincy, advising that it should, as far as possible, be 
69 ,, based on traditional groupings and traditional legitimacy. In Yaounde this 
amounted to two major changes. First, the position of superior chief was 
gradually phased out altogether, so that as incumbents died they were not 
replaced except in areas where the chieftaincy had been particularly strong. 
Second, villages were regrouped on the lines of kinship units, with new 
village chiefs who were intended to represent positions of authority in the 
kinship structure. In effect, the policy began to return some powers to 
the smaller units and advocated the gradual abandonment of the elite policy 
pursued during the 1920s. In fact, the demise of the chiefs was not 
completed until the abolition of the indig~nat in 1946, because of the 
government's reluctance to relinquish direct control over its largest and 
most productive population. In 1938 the annual report describes with 
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trepidation the effects of increasing levels of real income among the village 
PO)?Ulation. 
Caught between the desire to respect indigenous customs ••• and 
the evolution created by education and respect for the indi-
vidual, the Administration sees its task becoming more and 
more difficult,,,The rapidity with which relationships 
(of authority) have been modified is likely to involve serious 
disorder if the local authorities do not follow it with the 
greatest attention ••• in order to limit the dangers of ultimate 
anarchy, 70_ 
As soon as the indiglnat was abolished in 1946 the chiefs were deprived of 
of any but economic means of maintaining the labor force on their plantations. 
in-many cases the villagers simply rep<;>ssessed the plantations which were on 
their land and had been W(!)rked by them for twenty years. The political 
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cons~rvatism of the Beti at this point i$ understandable in terms of their 
liberation frol!l their most immediately constraining condition, the chief-
taincy sy$tem. The first <;>rder of business was to raise their own · stand.ard 
of liying, 
Conclu$ion 
Colonial policy in Cameroun went through a phase.between 1925 and 1934 
which corresponds closely to Rey's concep·t of the colonial mode of production, 
when the government tried to mobilize the natural and human resources of the 
country in a highly directive manner. The overall model, however, does not 
deal with the local. variations behind the aggregate figures and the general 
picture. The same policy had different implications for farming patterns 
and social relationships .in different regions. As Joseph describes in detail, 
the different peasant popul.ations of Southern Cameroun emerged from the 
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stringency and poverty of World War II with very different political interests 
and levels of welfare. 
Using the tax rate as an index of the relative level of constraint, this 
paper has explored some of the concomitants of high levels of appropriation, 
esp~cially ip. areas where economic growth was taking place. It has been 
suggested that social institutions, namely chieftaincy supported by the 
administration, had to_be created and maintained to generate such a high 
level of appropriation directly out of people's pockets, especially in areas 
with natural resources and large populations. These institutions then became 
an additional force in the local political economy. Where rates of appropri-
~tion were pushed particularly high, in cash and in kind, they affected all 
levels -0f the social structure; they involved not only changes at the top of 
the political hierarchy, but resulted in changes in the deployment of the 
labor·force in the domestic units at the bottom. 
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Appendix: Method 
The statistics are taken exclusively from the Annual Reports of the 
French government of Cameroun to the Permanent Mandate Commission of the 
League of Nations. This section summarizes and explains the use to which 
they are put. The main assumptions are: 1) that the direction of change 
in the export value of the major agricultural products accurately reflects 
the direction of change in the producers' money incomes; 2) that head tax 
and medical tax (Assistance Midicale Indig~ne) were the main direct taxes 
on the indigenous population; and 3) that the direction of change in the 
import value of cloth accurately reflects the direction of change in the 
producers' cost of living in the cash sector. 
1) The first is more complex than the others. The major agricultural 
exports are taken to be: bananas, groundnuts, sesame, palm kernels, coffee, 
cocoa, palm oil and rubber. Figure 5 summarizes their relative importance. 
Cotton is excluded because it appears only intermittently in the export 
statistics, with some unexplained discrepancies. Cotton and other products 
had local importance but were very minor at the national level. These 
eight products account for at least three-quarters of Cameroun's total export 
value throughout the interwar period. Timber is the most important product 
which accounts for the rest. 
These products are assumed to be produced entirely in the indigenous 
economy, and that the earnings went only to Camerounians, This is not the 
case, especially for the period after 1935, when European cultivation was 
important in coffee, bananas, and rubber. An estimate of indigenous 
production, by crop, was made in 1935 which concludes that ninety-one percent 
of total export value for· the eight major products came from Camerounian 
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farms. This proportion fell between 1936 and 1938 as European production 
elCPanded, but since there is no data for other years to compare directly 
with 1935, the figures have not been adjusted. 
For the purpose of analysis I assume that the income from export crop 
production is the only source of cash income in the indigenous economy, 
Again, this is clearly not the case, but estimates of the nuruber of people 
in paid employment are only three to four percent of .the adult population in 
1938 and the wages were very low. 
For the purpose of looking at trends in producers' incomes, it is assumed 
that the rate of return to middlemen is constant over time. Although not 
necessarily true, there is no data on which to base an adjustment, therefore 
the trend in export values is assumed to be an accurate index of the trend 
in producers' money incomes. 
2) Head tax and medical tax were the two ta.xes levied from the broadest 
section of the population. Other direct taxes, income tax on both Europeans 
and Camerounians, rachat des prestations, licenses, involved particular 
groups. Head tax, to be understood as including AMI, was always at least 
eighty percent of total direct taxes. It will therefore be used as the index 
of cash appropriation from the indigenous population. 
3) Real income will be calculated as total export value of the major 
agricultural products, minus head tax, valued against cotton cloth. Cotton 
cloth was the largest single import item throughout the interwar period, 
accounting for approximately twenty percent of total import value. 
All budget statistics are for recettes ordinaires and d~penses ordinaires, 
and therefore do not include investment funds either raised from abroad or from 
f the caisse de reserve. 
In sullllll"ry, the simplest and most important statistics are used and 
assumed to dominate trends. 
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